{"id":202114,"date":"2022-10-21T10:00:35","date_gmt":"2022-10-21T14:00:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.constructionspecifier.com\/?p=202114"},"modified":"2023-03-21T11:57:56","modified_gmt":"2023-03-21T15:57:56","slug":"testing-and-specifications-aluminum-framed-fenestration-assemblies","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.constructionspecifier.com\/testing-and-specifications-aluminum-framed-fenestration-assemblies\/","title":{"rendered":"Testing and specifications: Aluminum-framed fenestration assemblies"},"content":{"rendered":"

Understanding their role in active shooter attacks<\/strong><\/p>\n

By Marc Donahue, EFCO<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>
Photos courtesy Armoured One\/EFCO <\/span><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Parents, school officials, teachers, staff, and facility managers are increasingly asking architects and specification professionals whether their buildings are taking all the precautions available to mitigate shooting incidents. While no building product component or system is truly \u201cbulletproof,\u201d industry resources are evolving to evaluate, select, and specify high-performance, aluminum-framed curtain wall, storefront, entrance, and window systems which can help protect against active shooter attacks in schools, universities, and other facilities.<\/p>\n

Based on real-life data and analytics, the Shooter Attack Test Method describes one rigorous ballistic and impact test regimen for whole product assemblies.<\/p>\n

School shootings statistics<\/strong><\/p>\n

The K-12 School Shooting Database1<\/sup> project is researched and maintained as part of the Advanced Thinking in Homeland Security (HSx) program at the Naval Postgraduate School\u2019s Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS). The database documents when a gun is brandished, fired, or a bullet hits school property for any reason, regardless of the number of victims, time of day, or day of the week. A subset of school shootings, a \u201cschool active shooter attack\u201d refers to when one or more individuals are actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined, populated area.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>
Figure 1 <\/span> Illustration courtesy K-12 Shooting Database <\/span><\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The CHDS data currently lists over 2000 total school shooting incidents from 1970 to present. More than 160 of these incidents meet the definition of a school active shooter attack.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>
Figure 2 <\/span> Illustration courtesy K-12 Shooting Database <\/span><\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The National Safety Security Protection Association (NSSPA) is a nonprofit organization focused on K-12 schools. Its all-volunteer membership includes subject matter experts in active shooter attacks, physical security, counter terrorism, building codes, architecture, education, psychology, engineering, and security technology. NSSPA2<\/sup> analyzed data from 1985 to 2019 data, using CHDS and Education Week\u2019s School Shooting Tracker.3<\/sup> According to the data, on average, a school shooting occurred every eight school days, lasted eight minutes (without hostages), during which, someone was shot every 60 seconds. These events typically involved only one shooter with a preplanned attack. Further, additional research observed how 25 percent of active shooter attacks in educational settings involved two to five shots fired.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>
Interior view cut-away of a thermally broken, aluminum-framed, single-hung tilt sash operable window assembly with architectural-grade structural performance.<\/span> Photo courtesy EFCO <\/span><\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The report also stated the majority of active shooter attacks occurred during the school day (93 percent) and inside a building (80 percent), with most taking place in hallways (24 percent), classrooms (21 percent), and cafeterias (13 percent). Though most attacks occurred inside a building, 20 percent were outside. Some of these involved the perpetrator shooting at windows and entrances to gain access.<\/p>\n

Out of the active shooter incidents where gunfire struck a school\u2019s entrance or window, 35 struck an exterior window, 12 struck an entry point, and 11 struck an interior window opening. There are more than 30 examples since 1985 of shooters gaining access to school buildings and interior rooms by shooting at windows, doors, and other whole fenestration product assemblies.<\/p>\n

Preventative measures<\/strong><\/p>\n

Alarm systems, security cameras, and other technology help to deter, detect, and distract a potential risk, and quickly alert emergency responders. When these deterrents fail, physical barriers are the first line of defense. Windows, doors, and fenestration systems offer transparency to see and assess the risk, but with an active shooter, ground-level glass also can become the first target.<\/p>\n

The Whole Building Design Guide (WBDG) resources on active shooter protective design4<\/sup> notes, \u201cUltimately, there are two options: impede the shooter or impede the bullet.\u201d Further, it states, \u201cSince most active shooter events generally last only minutes, access denial can be an effective way to mitigate potential losses. Slowing or delaying an aggressor by just a minute or seconds may give law enforcement time to arrive before mass casualties are incurred.\u201d<\/p>\n

The WBDG acknowledges how specifying fenestration product assemblies similar to those in high-security courthouses and embassies \u201cis often not practical, cost-effective, or even desired\u201d for schools. \u201cAnalysis of footage from actual active shooter events have shown the shooter will likely not spend significant time trying to get through a particular door if it is locked or blocked,\u201d continued the WBDG. \u201cRather they move to their next target. They know law enforcement is on its way and their time is limited.\u201d<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>
An aluminum-framed window assembly being prepared by a qualified laboratory for a Shooter Attack Test. Tested assemblies for shooter attack applications provide consistent and repeatable performance, similar to other safety-critical applications. <\/span><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Given \u201cthe current architectural preference for large amounts of glazing to provide natural light into spaces,\u201d the WBDG recommends where windows are present, \u201cthey contain laminated glass which provides some resistance to ballistics attack and forced entry.\u201d It adds, \u201csome level of protective glazing, especially for windows and doors near lobbies and other entrances offer a potential area where simple improvements can provide significant benefit.\u201d<\/p>\n

The WBDG also cautioned, \u201cThe lack of guidance documents focusing specifically on active shooter designs will likely lead to varying levels of implementation and reliance on methods and technologies which may not be as effective or cost efficient.\u201d<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>
Several fenestration product assemblies meet the requirements of the Shooter Attack Test Method and are now available for specification and installation. The tested specimen realistically demonstrates how the whole product assembly would perform if an active shooter were to shoot and then use bodyweight or an object to apply force to the compromised glass surface.<\/span><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Some existing standards, industry guidelines, and technical papers pertaining to security performance of windows, entrances, other fenestration products assemblies, and key components include:<\/p>\n